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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LAKE MOHEGAN PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 2956, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-26743 
- and -
LAKE MOHEGAN FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (RICHARD CORENTHAL of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
LAMB & BARNOSKY, LLP (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN and 
ALYSON MATHEWS, of counsel) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Lake Mohegan 
Professional Firefighters Association, Local 2956, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge 
alleging, as amended, that the Lake Mohegan Fire District (District) violated §§209-
a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when the District 
unilaterally modified its policy with respect to the dispatch of a District vehicle in 
response to certain calls. 
The District filed an answer that denied that it violated the Act and raised various 
] 
affirmative defenses. 
A hearing was held before the ALJ on February 8, 2007. At the conclusion of the 
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Association's case, the District moved to dismiss the charge on the following grounds: 
waiver or duty satisfaction based on Article XI of the parties' contract and the alleged 
failure of the Association to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case. 
On June 27, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision granting the District's motion and 
dismissing the charge. In the decision, the ALJ concluded that, after accepting all of the 
Association's evidence asLbeing true and[.granting.all.reasonable.inferences to that 
evidence, the Association failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that the District 
violated §§209-a1(a) and (d) of the Act when it changed its policy regarding the dispatch 
of the vehicle known as Utility 40 (U-40). 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association filed twenty-two exceptions challenging the ALJ's dismissal of 
the Association's claim that the District had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act.1 In its 
exceptions, the Association asserts that the ALJ failed to assume the truth of the 
Association's evidence, disregarded the purpose underlying the District's policy, failed 
to cite various facts in the record and misapplied the applicable legal precedent. The 
District supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, consideration of the parties' arguments and 
application of relevant precedent, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the Association's 
charge for failure to establish a prima facie case. 
FACTS 
The Board's recitation of the following facts is premised on our assumption that 
1
 The Association did not file an exception challenging the dismissal of its claim 
alleging a violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act. Therefore, it is waived. Rules, 
§213.2(b); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007). 
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all of the Association's evidence is true and after granting all reasonable inferences from] { 
9 i ! those assumed facts. 
f 
1 
The District covers approximately 42 square miles in the Town of Cortlandt and the % 
Town of Yorktown which are located in Westchester County. The Association represents 
i 
a bargaining unit comprised of full-time professional fire fighters who are required by the 
District to be certified, as emergency medical technicians.(firefighter/EIVIT) 
In June 1999, bargaining unit member Ken Polito (Polito) collapsed due to heat 
exhaustion at the site of a rubbish fire. At the time, the District had a procedure in place 
that sent one engine with one firefighter/EMT in response to certain calls. 
A few weeks after the Polito incident, the Association held a meeting where 
bargaining unit members expressed concerns about their safety when they were left 
alone for extended periods of time at fire and EMT calls. Following the meeting, the 
Association's president Ron Delullo (Delullo) sent a letter requesting a meeting with the 
Board of Fire Commissioners (Commissioners): 
Due to recent incidents within the Lake Mohegan Fire 
District, concerning members of the Lake Mohegan Fire 
Fighters I.A.F.F. Local 2956, in which members felt concern 
and well being [sic] of their safety as president of this local I 
am requesting a meeting to address this concern. 
As you are aware the number of calls within the District are 
rising, causing a strain on the volunteers and professional 
Fire Fighters in the District. Response time for Ambulances 
has risen as well as number of calls going mutual aid to 
other Ambulances, leaving Fire Fighters alone to do to much 
for extended periods of time. Response times to outlying 
parts of the District has also risen leaving Fire Fighters 
stranded alone. These are some concerns affecting the 
members of this District, as well as the public. Through this 
2
 See, County of Nassau (Police Dept), 17 PERB fi3013, at 3030 (1984); 
Board of Educ of the City Sen Distofthe City of Buffalo, 24 PERB fl3033 (1991); 
UFT (Fearon), 37 PERB 1J3029 (2004). 
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meeting we hope to address these concerns plus others, 
and strive at possible solutions. 
In response to the letter, the District met with the Association in August 1999. 
During the meeting, the Association reiterated its safety concerns relating to 
firefighter/EMTs being left alone for extended periods of time at both fire and EMS 
scenes. At the meeting, there was a consensus between the Association and the District 
that the situation was caused by response delays by volunteer firefighters, the Lake 
Mohegan volunteer ambulance squads and paramedics from outside agencies. To 
remedy the problem, the Association suggested that the District purchase an additional 
vehicle to be dispatched as a means of providing back-up assistance for firefighter/EMTs. 
The Commissioners indicated at the meeting that they were receptive to the idea. 
The following day, Captain Strauss telephoned Delullo to inform him that the 
District was going to purchase a vehicle that would be used to provide assistance and 
back up for firefighter/EMT's safety. At a January 2000 meeting, the Commissioners 
approved the purchase of a four-door Ford Explorer. At a March 2000 Commissioners' 
meeting, there was discussion regarding the use of the new vehicle. The 
Commissioners' meeting minutes state, in part: 
Was told that it is part of the services that are offered to the 
public and it is not a separate budget item. Was concerned 
re: duplication of services within the town. The matter was 
discussed at length. Report will be bought [sic] back next 
month re: truck response. The Squad car was discussed at 
length. The car is mainly a safety net for the career 
personnel. The head count will go from 2 to 3 at 
headquarters. Career Deuilio stressed that there is no 
duplication of service. Irwin Goldman questioned whether 
the EMT from the squad car could ride the ambulance in 
case no EMT responds with the ambulance. The answer is 
no. It defeats the purpose of the squad car re: safety. 
Fremont Reif said that the engine is helpful when it 
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response. [sic] Career FF David Cercena spoke on the 
response, (emphasis added) 
In April 2000, the District purchased the Ford Explorer and equipped it with both 
EMT and firefighter equipment including a defibrillator, a thermal imaging camera, an 
automatic pulse machine, bandages and ice packs. The vehicle, known as U-40, is 
designed expressly to provide safety assistance to firefighters/EMTs at fire and EMS 
scenes. 
Following the purchase, U-40 was staffed by a firefighter/EMT in the bargaining 
unit. The vehicle was dispatched in response to all fire and EMS calls received by the 
District. If the first firefighter/EMT on the scene concluded that U-40 was unnecessary, 
the U-40 dispatch would be cancelled and it would be rerouted to a fire station. 
In November 2000, after consultation with the Association, the District issued a 
document entitled "Response of Utility 40" setting forth the applicable protocol for U-40. 
The document states, in part: 
PURPOSE: TO ENSURE THAT AN ADDITIONAL FF/EMT 
RESPONDS TO PRIMARILY ONE ENGINE/TRUCK 
RESPONSES TO ASSIST WITH FIREFIGHTER SAFETY 
AT THE SCENE OF AN EMERGENCY RELATED TO FIRE 
IN STRUCTURE. 
THIS VEHCILE WILL RESPOND FROM HEADQUARTERS 
IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF AN EMS OR FIRE 
CALL, ALONG WITH AN ENGINE OR TRUCK FROM 
STATIONS 1, 2, 3, AND 4. (emphasis added). 
Between 2001 and 2006, on a number of occasions the District modified the 
response procedures regarding U-40. In April 2003, the District issued another 
document entitled "Response of Utility 40" which states, in part: 
PURPOSE: TO ENSURE THAT AN ADDITIONAL FF/EMT 
RESPONDS TO PRIMARILY ONE ENGINE/TRUCK 
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RESPONSES 70 ASSIST WITH FIREFIGHTER SAFETY 
AT THE SCENE OF AN EMERGENCY. 
THIS VEHCILE WILL RESPOND FROM HEADQUARTERS 
IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF AN EMS OR FIRE 
CALL, ALONG WITH AN ENGINE OR TRUCK FROM 
STATIONS 1, 2, 3, AND 4. (emphasis added) 
During the hearing, Association witnesses testified that the purpose of U-40 is 
aimed at protecting firefighter/EMT safety by ensuringthatthe first responding -
firefighter/EMT has assistance from a back-up firefighter/EMT when confronting 
potential physical dangers at a scene including volatile, if not violent and combative, 
situations. Association witnesses described how they feel safer and more secure when 
responding to calls and in the performance of their duties knowing that the dispatch of 
U-40 will ensure the presence of an "extra set of eyes." 
In March 2006, Captain Strauss announced the District's unilateral new policy 
modifying the dispatch of U-40 with respect to EMS calls. Under the new policy, U-40 is 
not automatically dispatched to the scene when the District receives what is deemed a 
non-critical EMS call. Instead, in response to a non-critical EMS call, U-40 is sent to 
cover the fire station left vacant by the responding fire apparatus rather than being 
automatically dispatched to the scene. Association witnesses testified that as a result of 
the District's unilateral change when a firefighter/EMT responds to a non-critical EMS 
call there is no guarantee of timely assistance from another firefighter/EMT, the police, 
volunteer ambulance squads and paramedics at the scene in case of an unanticipated 
dangerous situation. However, the District continues to automatically dispatch U-40 in 
response to fire calls and critical EMS calls such as cardiac arrest or major trauma. 
On April 6, 2006, Association president Thomas Eade sent a letter to the District 
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objecting to the District's unilateral policy change regarding the dispatch of U-40 in 
response to non-critical EMS calls. In his letter, Eade stated that safety constitutes a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and that the District is obligated to negotiate with the 
Association prior to making such a change to U-40 protocols. One month later, the 
District responded to Eade's letter. 
DISCUSSION 
The Board will affirm an ALJ's decision to grant a motion to dismiss an improper 
practice charge at the close of the charging party's case where the evidence produced 
by the charging party, after granting all reasonable inferences, is plainly insufficient to 
warrant a finding that the charge should be sustained.3 
In its exceptions, the Association asserts that the ALJ, in considering the District's 
motion, failed to assume the truth of the Association's evidence and grant all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the Association with respect to that evidence. We disagree. 
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ granted all 
reasonable inferences to the Association's evidence in concluding that the unilateral 
change in the U-40 dispatch policy relates predominately to staffing rather than safety 
and therefore constitutes a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. 
In City of New York4, the Board recently reiterated that although safety is 
generally a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Act, our cases have equally 
recognized that determinations relating to staffing and deployment of personnel are 
nonmandatory subjects because they are managerial prerogatives tied to the public 
3
 County of Nassau (Police Dept), supra, note 2. 
440PERBfl3017(2007). 
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employer's mission to provide public services .5 
In determining whether a bargaining demand implicating both staffing and safety 
is a mandatory subject, we focus on the primary or predominate characteristic of the 
demand.6 Our focus on the demand's predominate characteristic is necessitated by our 
recognition that many staffing and deployment decisions can have safety implications. 
\n State of New York (DepLofTransportation)? the Board applied the same 
analysis in determining whether a unilateral change in a past practice that implicated 
both staffing and safety constituted a mandatory subject. 
In the present case, granting all reasonable inferences to the Association's 
evidence as we must, we conclude that the subject matter of the changed practice is 
one of deployment and not safety. Just as the level of staffing assigned to an 
employer's vehicle is nonmandatory, even though it may implicate employee safety, the 
District's change in the deployment of U-40 and the assigned employee in response to 
5
 See also, White Plains PBA, 9 PERB 1J3007 (1976); Orange County Comm Coil 
and County of Orange, 9 PERB 1J3068 (1976); Intl Assn of Firefighters of the City 
ofNewburgh, Local 589, 10 PERBP001 (1977), confirmed sub nom., Intl Assn 
of Firefighters v Helsby, 59 AD2d 342, 10 PERB H7019 (3d Dept 1977) Iv denied, 
43 NY2d 649 (1978); Police Assn of New Rochelle, /nc.,10 PERB 1J3042 (1977); 
Uniformed Firefighters Assn, Inc., Local 273, IAFF, 10 PERB1J3078 (1977); 
confirmed sub nom., City of New Rochelle v Crowley, 61 AD2d 1031,11 PERB 
1J7002 (2d Dept 1978); Troy Uniformed Firefighters Assn, Local 2304, IAFF, 10 
PERB U3105 (1977); City of Mount Vernon, 11 PERB 1J3049 (1978); New York 
State Court Employees Assn, 12 PERB TJ3075 (1979), revd in part sub nom., 
Evans v Newman, 71 AD2d 240,12 PERB 1J7022 (3d Dept 1979), affd, 49 NY2d 
904, 13 PERB 1J7004 (1980); State of New York (Unified Court System), 25 
PERB 1J3065 (1992J; State of New York (Dept of Transportation), 27 PERB 
P056 (1994); Town ofCarmel, 31 PERB 1J3006 (1998). 
6
 Supra, note 5. 
7
 Supra, note 5. 
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non-critical calls is nonmandatory. 
During its direct case, the Association presented various documents and 
protocols issued by the District identifying firefighter/EMT safety as the primary purpose 
for the purchase and use of U-40. It also established that U-40 is equipped with safety 
equipment. In addition, it presented evidence regarding the safety role played by the U-
40 firefighter/EMT at a scene as well as the subjective safety concerns of Association, 
members. 
We conclude that the Association's evidence is insufficient to establish that the 
subject matter of the unilateral change in the present case is mandatory. The change is 
limited to U-40 being dispatched initially to a vacant fire station rather than it being 
dispatched automatically to the scene of a non-critical call. The expressed purpose in 
purchasing and utilizing U-40 has no relevancy in our determination regarding the 
subject matter of the District's minor change in protocol. The predominate nature of the 
change remains the deployment of staff rather than safety. Therefore, it constitutes a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 23, 2008 
Albany, New York 
// Jerome Lefk^witz, Chairman 
~ Robert S. Hite, Member 
J^>tfy*t<^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA CHARTER SCHOOL 
CASE NO. DR-120 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (NEIL H. ABRAMSON of counsel), for Niagara 
Charter School 
MICHAEL DEELY, for Niagara Charter School Instructional Staff 
Association, Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association, NYSUT 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Niagara Charter School 
(NCS) to a recommended declaratory ruling and decision1 by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing a petition for a declaratory ruling (petition) filed by NCS. 
On April 25, 2007, NCS filed a petition, pursuant to §210.1 of the Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), seeking a declaratory ruling as to whether the recognition and/or 
certification provisions of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and PERB's 
Rules are applicable to NCS instructional employees. The Niagara Charter School 
Instructional Staff Association, Niagara Wheatfield Teachers Association, NYSUT 
(Association) asserts it represents the at-issue employees pursuant to the New York 
Charter Schools Act of 1998, Education Law §2850, et seq (Charter Schools Act). 
On May 18, 2007, the Association filed a response to the petition asserting that 
as a matter of law it is the bargaining representative for the NCS instructional 
employees under Education Law §2854(3)(b-1)(i). 
1
 40 PERB H6603 (2007). 
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In lieu of a hearing, the parties stipulated to the record, which contains the 
petition and response along with a stipulation of facts and law. 
On October 11, 2007, the ALJ dismissed the petition for a declaratory ruling on 
the ground that it did not raise a justiciable dispute under §210.1 (a) of the Rules. 
EXCEPTIONS 
-4n its exceptions, NCS contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing tha petition 
because the petition seeks a ruling as to the applicability of the recognition and 
certification procedures in the Act and Rules to the employees that the Association 
asserts it represents. In addition, NCS argues that the ALJ erred in failing to determine 
whether a declaratory ruling is in the public interest pursuant to §210.2(a) of the Rules. 
The Association has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of NCS's arguments, we 
) 
affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are the subject of a stipulation between the parties and are 
thereby undisputed: a) NCS is not a conversion from an existing public school and is 
the only charter school in Niagara County; b) on August 21, 2006, NCS began 
operations with a student enrollment of 264; c) NCS takes the position that NCS 
instructional employees are currently not represented by an employee organization for 
purposes of collective bargaining; d) on March 26, 2007, the Association requested that 
NCS commence negotiations with the Association as the exclusive bargaining 
representative for NCS instructional staff; e) on April 24, 2007, NCS responded with a 
letter articulating legal concerns that a grant of the Association's request to bargain 
without a showing of interest would violate the Act as well as the United States 
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Constitution; f) the Association has not filed with PERB a representation petition 
pursuant to §201 of the Rules, has not presented a showing of interest and does not 
claim to have majority status among NCS instructional employees. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 210.1(a) of the Rules permits any person, employee organization or 
employer to file a petition for a declaratory jujing "with respect to the applicability of the_. 
act to it or any other person, employee organization or employer or with respect to the 
scope of negotiations under the act." Thus, the subject matter that can be resolved in 
the context of a petition for declaratory ruling is limited to whether an individual or entity 
is subject to the Act or whether a particular negotiation subject is mandatory, 
nonmandatory or prohibited. 
The limited purposes of the declaratory ruling process were recently reiterated in 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc.2 In that case, we 
affirmed the dismissal of a petition for a declaratory ruling by an employee organization 
that sought an interpretation of a provision in a collectively negotiated agreement 
between the public employer and another employee organization. The dismissal was 
affirmed because the subject matter of the petition was beyond the stated purposes for 
the declaratory ruling process under the Rules. Similarly, in City of Pittsburgh,3 we 
underscored the limited nature of the issues that can be resolved in the context of a 
declaratory ruling. 
In the present case, we conclude that the subject matter of NCS's petition is 
beyond the stated purpose for the declaratory ruling process under §210.1 (a) of the Rules. 
2
 40 PERB ]j3019 (2007). 
3
 32 PERB 1J3014 (1999). 
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Before the ALJ, the parties stipulated that under the Charter Schools Act, NCS is 
a public employer under the Act and that the NCS instructional employees are public 
employees under the Act. In its exceptions, NCS does not dispute those legal 
conclusions, which are based on the express provisions contained in Education Law 
§2854(3)(a), nor does it dispute that the Association is an employee organization under 
the Act. Similarly, NCS does not claim.that the petition seeks a ruling as to whether a 
particular negotiation demand is a mandatory, nonmandatory or prohibited subject of 
negotiations. 
Instead, what NCS seeks, in essence, is an administrative legal adjudication, 
equivalent to a declaratory judgment under CPLR §3001, analyzing the interplay 
between the representation procedures under the Act and Rules and the provisions of 
the Charter Schools Act, Education Law §§2854(1 )(a)4 and 2854(3)(b-1 )(i).5 
4
 Education Law §2854(1 )(a) states: "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the 
contrary, to the extent that any provision of this article is inconsistent with any other 
state or local law, rule or regulation, the provisions of this article shall govern and be 
controlling." 
5
 Education Law §2854(3)(b-1 )(i) states: 
The employees of a charter school that is not a conversion from an existing 
public school shall not be deemed members of any existing collective bargaining 
unit representing employees of the school district in which the charter school is 
located, and the charter school and its employees shall not be subject to any 
existing collective bargaining agreement between the school district and its 
employees. Provided, however, that (i) if the student enrollment of the charter 
school on the first day on which the charter school commences student 
instruction exceeds two hundred fifty or if the average daily student enrollment of 
such school exceeds two hundred fifty students at any point during the first two 
years after the charter school commences student instruction, all employees of 
the school who are eligible for representation under article fourteen of the civil 
service law shall be deemed to be represented in a separate negotiating unit at 
the charter school by the same employee organization, if any, that represents like 
employees in the school district in which such charter school is located. 
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The purpose of the declaratory ruling process is to provide a less adversarial 
means than an improper practice charge for resolving justiciable issues regarding the 
subject matters set forth in §210.1 (a) of the Rules.6 It was never intended to be a 
substitute for a declaratory judgment action nor as a means of obtaining determinations 
as to whether an employer has a statutory duty to negotiate with an employee 
organization under.the.Act.7 In addition, as the .ALJjcorrectly. concluded, the process.is... 
not intended for determinations relating to the applicability of the Rules. 
NCS's reliance on Village ofElmira Heights8 is misplaced. First, the Board is not 
bound by an earlier unreviewed decision of a Director or an ALJ.9 Moreover, as the ALJ 
correctly recognized, the petition in that case sought a declaration on the applicability of 
the Act to the parties, while NCS's petition requires both an interpretation of the 
applicability of the Rules and the provisions of the Charter School Act. 
Finally, we disagree with NCS's argument premised on §210.2(a) of the Rules. 
Section 210.2(a) of the Rules grants the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) the authority to dismiss a petition when the Director concludes 
that a determination would not be in the public interest. This grant of authority to the 
Director to dismiss a petition on public interest grounds does not constitute an additional 
"public interest" basis for the granting of a declaratory ruling beyond the subject matters 
identified in §210.1 (a) of the Rules. Moreover, issuance of a declaratory ruling on a 
6
 State of New York (Division of State Police), 38 PERB 1J3007 (2006). The Board takes 
administrative notice that there is a pending improper practice charge, Case No. U-27727, 
related to the subject matter of NCS's petition. 
7
 County of Orange, 28 PERB 1J6601 (1995). 
8
 26 PERB 1J6602 (1993). 
9
 Westchester County Dept of Correction Superior Officers' Assn, 26 PERB P077 (1993). 
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Iegal issue beyond the purpose of the declaratory ruling procedure would not be in the 
public interest pursuant to §210.2(a) of the Rules.10 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the petition. 
DATED: January 23, 2008 
Albany, New York
 A r~J? 
0 / //? -ft' 
Jerome Lefkoj/l/itz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
10
 PBA of the City of New York, Inc., supra, note 2. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BINGHAMTON, 
Employer, 
-.and.- ....... CASE NO.J32007^003 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 
LOCAL UNION NO. 693, 
Grievant. 
KENNETH J. FRANK, CORPORATION COUNSEL, for City of Binghamton 
HICKEY, SHEEHAN & GATES, P.C. (DENNIS F. SHEEHAN of counsel) for 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 693 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Binghamton 
(City) to an arbitration decision and award sustaining a grievance filed by the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 693 (IBT). The grievance 
alleges that the City violated the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between 
the City and the IBT when it filled a Parking Meter Maintainer vacancy. 
On October 30, 2007, an arbitration was conducted by PERB's Assistant Director 
of Conciliation (Assistant Director) in his role as the arbitrator duly appointed to hear the 
grievance pursuant to PERB's staff grievance mediation/arbitration procedure 
(mediation/arbitration procedure). 
In the arbitration decision and award, dated November 20, 2007, the Assistant 
) Director found that the City violated §37 of the agreement when it appointed Thomas 
Ryder to the position of Parking Meter Maintainer over grievant Daniel Rose. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the City contends the arbitrator misinterpreted the agreement 
and allegedly ignored a 2002 arbitration decision and award issued by another arbitrator 
determining an earlier IBT grievance that alleged the City had violated §37 of the 
agreement in filling a vacancy. Furthermore, the City challenges the arbitration decision 
and award on the ground that the arbitrator allegedly acted in "bad faith." 
The IBT objects to the City's exceptions, contending that an arbitration award 
issued pursuant to the staff grievance mediation/arbitration procedure is not subject to 
exceptions to the Board. In the alternative, the IBT supports the arbitration decision and 
award. 
In response to the IBT's procedural objections, the City contends that the 2002 
arbitration decision and award and the November 20, 2007 arbitration decision and 
award constitute inconsistent "PERB decisions." Furthermore, the City asserts that by 
filing exceptions to the Board it is exhausting its administrative remedies. 
FACTS 
The IBT filed a grievance on behalf of bargaining unit member Daniel Rose 
alleging that the City violated the agreement when it selected a less senior employee, 
Thomas Ryder, to fill a Parking Meter Maintainer vacancy. The grievance was 
processed under the agreement to and including arbitration. 
In a July 30, 2007 letter, the parties jointly requested the appointment of the 
Assistant Director to provide mediation and arbitration services aimed at reaching a final 
resolution of the grievance pursuant to the mediation/arbitration procedure. The PERB 
form for requesting the mediation/arbitration procedure states that an arbitration 
decision and award issued is final and binding on the parties and may not be the subject 
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of exceptions to the Board. In addition, the form states: "Judicial review of any award 
issued by the PERB med-arbitrator may be sought only under CPLR Article 75." 
On August 20, 2007, the Director appointed the Assistant Director to provide the 
requested mediation and arbitration services to the parties. Following an unsuccessful 
mediation, the Assistant Director conducted the arbitration on October 30, 2007. On 
...Novemb.er-20,2007, the Assistant Director issued an arbitration decision and award . 
sustaining the grievance and imposing a remedy. 
DISCUSSION 
In response to the City's exceptions, the IBT argues that the City's exceptions 
should be denied because exceptions pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) are prohibited under the mediation/arbitration procedures offered by the agency 
and agreed to by the parties. We agree. 
Both the guidelines for the mediation/arbitration procedure, as well as the 
applicable agency form, state explicitly that an arbitration decision and award issued by 
a staff member may only be challenged through a proceeding commenced pursuant to 
CPLR §7511 and not through exceptions to the Board pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules. 
We take administrative notice that in over a dozen prior grievances, the City and IBT 
agreed to this condition when they utilized the mediation/arbitration procedure. By 
voluntarily requesting the mediation/arbitration process to resolve the grievance in the 
present case, both parties waived any claimed right to file exceptions to the Board from 
the arbitration decision and award pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules. Moreover, pursuant 
to §205.5(d) of the Act, PERB lacks jurisdiction to interpret collective bargaining 
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agreements except as necessary for the proper exercise of our improper practice 
jurisdiction.1 
Contrary to the City's argument, an arbitration decision and award issued under 
the mediation/arbitration process or an arbitration decision and award issued under the 
voluntary grievance arbitration procedure pursuant to Part 207 of the Rules do not 
constitute a "PERB-decision." Rather, they constituteiawards that may be subject to the 
post-arbitration procedures contained in CPLR §§7509, 7510 and 7511. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the City's exceptions on jurisdictional grounds. 
DATED: January 23, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz; Chairman 
&L/-SJ& 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
1
 City of Troy, 28 PERB P057 (1995). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 118, 
— -Petitioner, --
-and- CASE NO. C-5747 
TOWN OF SPRINGWATER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
) A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union No. 118 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5747 
Included: Full-time and Part-time employees of the Highway Department. 
Excluded: Supervisory, Temporary Seasonal Employees, Clericals and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union No. 118. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 23, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Q£*y%*c^ 
Jerome Lefk^witz, Chapman 
4/ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
; 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL 
INSTRUCTIONAL STAFF ASSOCIATION 
NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5753 
COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
) CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Community Charter School Instructional 
Staff Association NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon 
by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
) collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5753 - 2 -
Included: All full and part-time Teachers, School Nurse, Social Worker, ten 
(10) month Building Substitute Teacher, and In-School Suspension 
Monitor. 
Excluded: Teacher Aide, Chief Financial Officer, School Principal, School 
Director, Director of the Family Resource Center, Network 
Admjnistra^to ten (10) month 
Substitute Teachers, Office Manager, Administrative Assistant, 
Food Service and Cafeteria Employees, and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Community Charter School Instructional Staff Association 
NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 23, 2008 
Albany, New York 
/JA&*?**— 
Jerome Lefkgfwitz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
